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2 August 1976  
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## MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Chief, SALT Support Staff

SUBJECT: Responses to Questions Posed by Governor Carter  
and Senator Mondale During Briefing in Plains,  
Georgia on July 28, 1976

Following are summaries of questions and answers on sensitive subjects associated with my briefing of Governor Carter and Senator Mondale on SALT and SALT Compliance:

1. Gov. Carter asked for an explanation of the disparity in numbers of SLBM launchers allowed both sides in the Interim Agreement. I replied that, as I had indicated earlier, the Interim Agreement froze the numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers operational and under active construction on both sides on July 1, 1972. There had been a disagreement on the number of Soviet SLBM submarines under construction on this date. This disagreement emanated from a failure to agree on the point in time when submarine construction was initiated. The US wanted to count them when assembly of hull sections began in the construction hall, the first point in the construction process which was verifiable by national technical means. The Soviet view was that construction began earlier in the process, when components were fabricated. They therefore claimed a total of 768 SLBM launchers operational and under construction, while the US figure was substantially less. There was an arbitrary decision reached that the Soviet figure was 710 launchers for modern SLBMs operational and under construction. Additionally, it was agreed that 30 older SLBM launchers on H-class submarines would count in the total (740) allowed before older ICBM or SLBM launchers had to be turned in on a one-for-one basis.

2. With respect to compliance issues, Gov. Carter asked if Zumwalt's charges that the Soviets were violating the SALT I agreements were true. I responded that the best

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way to answer that question was to run through each of the issues, relating the intelligence information pertaining to each to the pertinent provisions of the Agreements. If the question was not answered adequately in this manner, we could return to it later. The question did not come up again.

3. Gov. Carter asked who in the US Government determines whether a violation (by the Soviets) has taken place. I responded by explaining how the Intelligence Community, Verification Panel Working Group, Verification Panel and NSC fit into the process, indicating that in the final analysis it was the President who made such a determination. Senator Mondale asked if there were any congressional inputs into this determination. I replied that certain members of Congress and Congressional committees and sub-committees had been briefed on the intelligence related to the issues, but that to my knowledge there was no congressional input to the VP-NSC process. Mr. Bush added that we did not know if the President had sought Congressional advice in the decision-making process.

4. Gov. Carter asked how long after the Soviets resumed construction of III-X silos in 1973 was the issue raised with the USSR, and at what level. I replied that it was raised about one week after the construction activity had been identified and at the Presidential level.

5. Senator Mondale asked if the Soviets had raised any questions concerning US compliance with the agreements. I replied in the affirmative, noting that the Soviets believed in keeping the scoreboard even. Mondale asked if any of the US activities raised by the Soviets in fact constituted violations of the agreements. I replied that, from the Soviet point of view, there were two serious issues -- shelters over Minuteman silos and confidentiality of proceedings of the Standing Consultative Commission. I provided background information on both issues. Mondale asked forcefully whether Minuteman shelters were a violation of the Interim Agreement. I responded that, if the Soviets were engaged in similar activity, I, as an intelligence officer, would recommend to the Director of Central Intelligence that he recommend to the Verification Panel that the matter be raised with the USSR as a compliance issue.

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6. Gov. Carter asked if we could verify MIRV limitations (it had evolved earlier that Gov. Carter mistakenly believed that the Vladivostok Accord represented an agreement in effect, rather than an agreement to agree). I ran through the bulk of the contingency statement on this subject contained in my original text, noting the monitoring requirements associated with MIRV verification and, as an example of one of the problems, the fact that three of the new Soviet ICBMs were being tested with both MIRV and single RV payloads. Stoertz pointed out that Secretary Kissinger had publicly noted this problem, stating that without a counting rule which resolved this question in favor of the observer, there could be no agreement.

7. Gov. Carter asked whether any agreements with the USSR provided for on-site inspection. I informed him of the provisions of the PNE Treaty in this respect, and took the opportunity to point out that, from a monitoring point of view, on-site inspection was not a panacea for verification of arms limitation agreements.

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